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ABSTRACT 
 
The study presents a Leontief-Miyazawa model to study personal and regional income 
inequality in Brazil. The economy is divided into 31 sectors, in 5 macro regions; 
households are allocated into 10 income brackets. The study identifies the contribution of 
different sectors to inequality. The model is used to simulate the capacity of social 
policies to reduce personal and regional inequality in the country. The analysis is 
conducted using the pro-poor “Bolsa Família” program which is a social program that 
provides direct income transfers to poor (with per capita income between BRL 60,01 and 
BRL 120,00) and extreme poor households (with per capita income below BRL 60,00). 
The results show that in the short run, the “Bolsa Família” program has proven to 
produce positive results, both at the personal income level and at the regional 
concentration level, and has surely paid large dividends in electoral terms. Solving 
inequality problems, however, might need other mid and long run policies which could 
improve competitiveness of lagging regions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of regional policy is the attainment of a more efficient and/or equitable 
interregional distribution of economic activity (Temple, 1994). As demonstrated 
elsewhere (Haddad, 1999), Brazil has undergone, in the last twenty years or so, deep 
structural changes, responsible for the setback in the process of polarization reversal in 
the economy. After 1988, with the new Constitution, the central government was 
hampered by a profound loss in its revenues to the state and municipal governments. 
Nevertheless, the fiscal crisis reached all levels of government, decreasing their financial 
capability for carrying out new investment ventures. The lack of investment in economic 
infrastructure increased the average cost of production; producers were facing increasing 
costs due to the inefficient mechanisms of trade and transportation, which lagged 
technologically. 
 
The regional de-concentration trend verified in the period from the 1960s to the early 
1980s was heavily induced by an active government intervention, manifested in actions 
such as direct investments in regional development projects and tax incentives in the less 
developed regions of the country. However, with the fiscal crisis generalized to all levels 
of government, little room for new public ventures became available. 
 
The agreed agenda for the country includes the competitive integration of the country in 
the global trade network, with the domestic concern of sustainable stabilization and social 
cohesion. This implies the attraction of foreign investments and a responsible (balanced) 
budget policy for all levels of government, reinforced by the promulgation of the “Lei de 
Responsabilidade Fiscal”, in 2000. The latter precludes regional policies based on heavy 
redistributional expenditures, as was the case in the 1970s. Foreign investors search for 
better financial returns, and, therefore, are not concerned with regional equity; location is 
defined on a purely economic basis. 
 
The results presented in Haddad (1999) suggest that the interplay of market forces in the 
Brazilian economy favors the more developed region of the country. In other words, the 
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trickling-down effects generated by market forces are still very unlikely to overtake the 
polarization effects from the Center-South. If regional equity is part of the country’s 
development agenda, an active regional policy by the central government is still needed, 
in order to reduce regional economic disparities, and specifically to address the problems 
of the North and Northeast, traditionally backward areas reliant on low technology 
activities. The improvement of the economic infrastructure in those regions, as well as 
the establishment of enduring competitive advantages, through a consistent human capital 
policy, are necessary to attenuate the adverse regional effects of the development strategy 
pursued by the public authorities. 
 
Nowadays, the regional policy carried out by the central government consists of isolated 
subsidies and industrial incentives to growth centers, in addition to constitutional 
transfers to less developed regions and rural areas. In the context of the fiscal adjustment 
process of the 1990s, the role of the central government in stimulating directly productive 
activities and enhancing the social overhead capital in the lagging regions is being 
neglected. In the conception of the Real Plan, there was no explicit concern about the 
formulation of a regional development policy for the country. The Real Plan was 
conceived as a global stabilization plan, which would include economic reforms 
(privatization, concessions and deregulation) and institutional reforms (tax system, social 
security and administrative), without proposing any strategy for medium and long-run 
development. However, with the benefits from the stabilization and the reforms, a new 
cycle of private investments emerged. These investments tended to concentrate in the 
South and Southeast regions, which provided a full range of non-traditional (e.g. 
technical skills and urban agglomeration) and traditional (e.g. friction of distance – 
Mercosul) locational factors to attract the incoming capital. The lack of investments by 
the central government, allied to the spurt in private investments, has led regional 
governments to engage in strong competition for private capital through fiscal 
mechanisms.  
 
Regarding the less developed regions of the North and Northeast, regional development 
necessarily demands direct government intervention. Their economic structure should 
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evolve to higher level of specialization in those activities where the regions present 
dynamic competitive advantage in order to define their role in the process of interregional 
and international integration. In the Northeast, for instance, different studies identified the 
regional competitive advantage in the productive transformation of the existing economic 
structure, based on the restructuring and modernization of specialized industrial 
complexes (e.g. the petrochemical complex in Bahia, and the mining complex in 
Maranhão); the modernization of the agricultural sector and the agriculturally-based 
industries; and the expansion of tourism and related activities. This strategy will need the 
active participation of public authorities through the adoption of regionally differentiated 
fiscal incentives, when necessary, and more important, through the provision of modern 
economic infrastructure and the formation and development of human resources in the 
region, emphasizing poverty alleviation and universal primary and secondary education 
(see Araújo, 1995, and Albuquerque and Gomes, 1996). An increasing emphasis on 
“economic” rather than “financial” incentives throughout Brazil should give rise to a new 
form of regional incentive based explicitly on building up dynamic comparative 
advantages rather than granting fiscal handouts.
1
  
 
Finally, the government has to identify priorities for investments in infrastructure. In this 
instance, the government will face conflicting choices in the allocation of the scarce 
resources. On the one hand, it is important to create and modernize the existing economic 
infrastructure in the lagging regions to facilitate the operation of the forces for the 
centrifugal spread of economic expansion in the more developed regions, and also to 
consolidate their regional competitiveness through the establishment of an effective stock 
of social overhead capital. On the other hand, demands for economic infrastructure are 
also perceived in the Southern part of the country, in the context of the increasing 
exposure to international markets. Increased trade involving the more complex economic 
spaces in the Center-South and foreign partners will face significant transportation costs, 
and unless the transportation sector can be adjusted, the country will not face high gains 
in competitiveness both in the internal and external markets. In this regard, attempts to 
deepen the regional roots of inward productive investments should focus on the building 
                                                 
1
 See Amann et al. (2006) 
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up of quality infrastructure and the facilitation of enhanced integration with regional, 
extra-regional and international markets. 
 
In this context, we can argue that nothing much has been done in the first four years of 
Lula’s administration. In terms of proper regional policy, central government relied only 
on constitutional intergovernmental transfers through regional funds
2
 – FNE, FNO, FCO 
– and rural pensions.  
 
However, the central government has been engaged in an effort to design and implement 
social compensatory policies with a strong spatial dimension. The pro-poor “Bolsa 
Família Program” is a program that provides direct income transfers to poor (with per 
capita income between BRL 60,01 and BRL 120,00) and extreme poor households (with 
per capita income below BRL 60,00). Given the geographical distribution of poor 
households in the country (Table 1), targeting benefits to the poor reflects an implicit 
concern with regional disparities in the country. Even though it cannot be considered an 
explicit strategy of geographic targeting to reduce poverty, it may achieve the goal of 
classical regional policies – namely, the reduction of regional disparities – through direct 
income transfers to poor households, which happen to be concentrated in poorer regions. 
However, this remains to be tested.  
 
                                                 
2
 Almeida et al. (2006) have investigated the resources allocations of the Northeast (FNE), North (FNO) 
and Center-West (FCO) Constitutional Financing Fund loans by municipalities, and have found out that the 
loans have not been directed to the poorest states or to the poorest municipalities. 
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Table 1. Households Eligible for Benefits from “Bolsa Família”, 2000 
Region Number of Poor Households % 
North 1,574,094 0.0917 
Northeast 7,140,519 0.4158 
South 2,006,596 0.1169 
Southeast 5,342,975 0.3111 
Mid-West 1,107,909 0.0645 
   Total 17,172,093 1.0000 
            Source: Demographic Census, 2000 
 
Thus, the goal of this paper is to assess the regional impacts of the Bolsa Família 
Program from a perspective of a socially targeted regional policy. After this brief 
introduction, we proceed, in section 2, with an analysis of the outcomes of the 2006 
presidential elections, looking at Lula’s performance in the first round, by municipality. 
We estimate different models to check what variables were determinant for his victory 
over the other candidates. It can be anticipated that direct income transfers through the 
Bolsa Família Program can be considered one of the most robust explanatory variables 
for determining a better electoral performance of the Labor Party’s candidate. With that 
result in mind, the Bolsa Família Program is evaluated through a regional policy 
perspective. Section 3 describes the methodology to be used in section 4, where the 
results are presented and discussed. Final remarks follow in section 5, putting the results 
into a broader perspective of the policy initiatives to be considered in Lula’s second 
mandate. 
 
2. Voters’ Evaluation: What do the ballots tell us? 
 
In this section we evaluate the main determinants of Lula voting in the first round of the 
2006 presidential elections. We begin the analysis with the choropleth map of the election 
data. Figure 1 shows the data for the percentage of Lula’s voting in the first round of the 
presidential elections in 2006, by municipality. The spatial pattern of the votes is 
illustrated in this map, with the darkest shade corresponding to the highest rate range. The 
suggestion of spatial clustering of similar values that follows from the visual inspection 
of this map needs to be confirmed by formal tests. 
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Figure 1. Lula Voting (% of Lula Voting in Relation to Total Voting) 
 
 
            Source: TSE 
 
The first step in a study of ESDA is to test this hypothesis: are the spatial data randomly 
distributed? To do that, it is necessary to use global autocorrelation statistics. The spatial 
correlation coefficient Moran’s I was used. The underlying hypothesis is spatial 
randomness, that is, there is the absence of spatial dependence in the data. Intuitively, 
spatial randomness can be expressed as follows: values of an attribute at a location do not 
depend on values of an attribute at neighboring locations. 
 
Figure 2 reports the global Moran’s I statistics for all municipalities in Brazil in 2006. 
The statistical evidence casts doubt on the assumption of spatial randomness of the Lula 
performance in the elections. In fact, since the computed value of I (0.7973) exceeds its 
theoretical value (zero), we can reject the hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation at 0.1% 
significance level.
3
 These results are invariant with regards to convention of binary 
neighborhood used for the construction of the spatial weights (queen or rook). In 
                                                 
3
 Empirical pseudo-significance based on 999 random permutations. 
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addition, Moran’s I provides clear indication that the spatial autocorrelation for Lula’s 
performance is positive. That is, municipalities with a high proportion of votes in the PT 
candidate are also adjacent to municipalities with a high proportion of Lula’s voters. In 
an analogous manner, municipalities with a relative low preference for Lula are adjacent 
to municipalities with a low preference as well. That is the intuitive meaning of positive 
spatial autocorrelation. 
 
An alternative approach to visualize spatial association is based on the concept of a 
Moran Scatterplot, which shows the spatial lag (i.e. the average of the attribute for the 
neighbors) on the vertical axis and the value at each location on the horizontal axis (see 
Figure 2). Note that the variables are expressed in standardized form with mean zero and 
standard deviation equal to one (Anselin, 1999, p. 261). 
 
Figure 2. Moran Scatterplot and Global Moran’s I Statistics for Lula’s Performance 
in the First Round of the 2006 Presidential Elections 
 
 
 
The global indicators of spatial association are not capable of identifying local patterns of 
spatial association, such as clusters or spatial outliers in the data that are statistically 
significant. To overcome this obstacle, it is necessary to implement a spatial clustering 
analysis. We used the local version of Moran’s I (LISA statistics) as the basis for testing 
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the null hypothesis of local randomness, that is, no local spatial association. Figure 3 
combines the information of the Moran Scatterplot and the LISA statistics. It illustrates 
the classification into four categories of spatial association that are statistically significant 
in terms of the LISA concept. We find evidence of spatial grouping: overall, there are 
some clusters of municipalities where Lula obtained a better performance, located in the 
less developed regions of the North and Northeast, as well as neighbors with high 
percentage of votes for Lula. Likewise, there are clusters of low performance located in 
the Center-South of the country. The question is: does Lula’s performance reflect his 
efforts in the first mandate to fight regional inequality or there is something else behind 
this seemingly paradoxal result, which shows that a government without any concrete 
regional policy action achieved its best evaluation in the regions that were left behind? 
 
Figure 3. Moran Significance Map for Lula Voting 
 
 
 
To tackle this issue, we estimated spatial econometric models to identify the main 
determinants of Lula’s performance in the 2006 elections. The dependent variable is the 
percentage of Lula’s voting in the first round of the presidential elections. We considered 
four groups of covariates in our models: 1. Spatial Structure Variables - Human 
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Development Index, Gini Coefficient and Per Capita GDP, all for year 2000; 2. 
Structural Regional Policy Variables - Per Capita Constitutional Transfers and Per Capita 
Rural Pension Payments,  both in 2006; 3. Social Policy Variables - Per Capita Income 
from Bolsa Família, 2006; Number of Households with Per Capita Income below R$ 
120,00 in 2000; 4. Economic and Political Variables - Dummy for Mayor affiliated to 
PSDB; Share of Agriculture in GDP, in 2002 
 
The spatial structure variables attempt to capture the spatial distribution of economic 
development in the country, reflecting a long-standing situation of regional dualism, 
reflecting voters’ perception according to different local socioeconomic profiles. The 
structural regional policy variables attempt to capture established regional policy, and 
therefore, a proper evaluation of the extra efforts by the central government. The set of 
social policy variables tries to capture not only an evaluation of the income transfer 
program, but also the expectation of its reinforcement in the second mandate. Finally, the 
economic and policy variables reflect the economic cycle and the local political scene 
affecting the evaluation of the current president. 
 
Three models were estimated. The first model was estimated using OLS. The two other 
models introduced space in a formal way, as suggested by the diagnostics tests. We 
considered (i) the estimation by means of maximum likelihood of a spatial regression 
model that includes a spatially lagged dependent variable
4
, and (ii) the estimation by 
means of maximum likelihood of a spatial regression model that includes a spatial 
autoregressive error term
5
. Results are presented in Tables 2 and 3, below. Bold figures 
are statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
In terms of the spatial structural variables, HDI and per capita GDP are negatively 
correlated with Lula’s performance in the elections, while Gini coefficient is positively 
                                                 
4
 Formally, this model is y = ρWy + Xβ + ε, where y is a vector of observations on the dependent variable, 
Wy is a spatially lagged dependent variable for weights matrix W, X is a matrix of observations on the 
explanatory variables, ε is a vector of i.i.d. error terms, and ρ and β are parameters. 
5
 Formally, this model is y = Xβ + ε, with ε = λWε + u, where y is a vector of observations on the 
dependent variable, W is the spatial weights matrix, X is a matrix of observations on the explanatory 
variables, ε is a vector of spatially autocorrelated error terms, u a vector of i.i.d. errors, and β and λ are 
parameters. 
 11 
correlated. In other words, the more developed, the richer and the less unequal the 
municipality, the lower the percentage voting in Lula at that locality. 
 
Moreover, in municipalities that are more benefited by structural regional policies, Lula 
presented a weaker performance in the first round of the elections. In our view, this 
reflects the neglecting of regional policy by the current government, as these regions, 
traditionally reliant on government compensatory regional policies, had their expectation 
frustrated by the almost null extra efforts set in this direction.   
 
Noteworthy is the robustness of the social policy variables. Municipalities with higher 
per capita transfers through the “Bolsa Família Program” and with the potential for its 
consolidation in the future, presented a positive evaluation of the Lula’s first mandate 
translated into greater proportion of votes. 
 
Regarding economic and political variables, current economic situation previous to 
elections, which hampered the agricultural sector (e.g. appreciation of Real, droughts, 
collapse of agricultural insurance funds), seem to have negatively affected Lula’s 
performance in the rural areas. Finally, from a political perspective, the role played by 
mayors belonging to the main opposition party, the PSDB, also influenced negatively 
Lula’s voting in those municipalities. 
 
In this context, in the next sections we take a closer look at the “Bolsa Família Program” 
from a regional perspective. We start by describing the Miyazawa framework, which will 
be used as the analytical tool for the evaluation of the Program. 
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Table 2. Quantitative Estimation Results (Dependent Variable: % of Lula’s Voting) 
OLS Spatial Lag Spatial Error
W_Lula - 0.74220660 -
Constant 0.73349120 0.16547210 0.57543630
HDI -0.43100760 -0.00628164 -0.15181800
Gini 0.18567520 -0.00186970 0.07700873
GDP (per capita) -0.00051066 -0.00025755 -0.00030405
Constitutional transfers (per capita) -0.00020904 -0.00006988 -0.00007210
Bolsa Familia income (per capita) 0.00067053 0.00022451 0.00022893
Rural pensions (per capita) -0.00000671 -0.00000540 -0.00000423
Number of poor households 0.00000153 0.00000027 0.00000001
Dummy_PSDB -0.01434254 -0.00659800 -0.00399306
Share_Agriculture -0.05965714 -0.01389732 -0.00703614
Lambda - - 0.83955020
R2 0.5541 0.7870 0.7918
Model
Coefficients
 
 
 
Table 3. Qualitative Estimation Results (Dependent Variable: % Lula’s Voting) 
OLS Spatial Lag Spatial Error
W_Lula - (+) -
Constant (+) (+) (+)
HDI (-) n.s. (-)
Gini (+) n.s. (+)
GDP (per capita) (-) (-) (-)
Constitutional transfers (per capita) (-) (-) (-)
Bolsa Familia income (per capita) (+) (+) (+)
Rural pensions (per capita) (-) (-) (-)
Number of poor households (+) (+) (+)
Dummy_PSDB (-) (-) n.s.
Share_Agriculture (-) (-) n.s.
Lambda - - (+)
Coefficients
Model
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3. Economic impacts: The Miyazawa Framework
6
 
 
In this paper we use a Leontief-Miazawa model, in which the intersectoral flows in the 
economy can be represented by a system of simultaneous equations such as YAXX  , 
in which X is a )1(nx  vector of sectoral production values, Y is a )1(nx  vector of sectoral 
final demands and A is a )(nxn  matrix of technical production coefficients. If final 
demand is treated as exogenous to the system, we have BYX  and 1)(  AIB , with 
B being the )(nxn Leontief inverse matrix. If the internal consumption demand is 
detached from the final demand vector, the model becomes ec YYY  , in which cY  is 
a )1(nx vector of income related consumption demand and eY  is the )1(nx  vector of 
exogenous demand (government expenditure, investment, exports).  
 
The multi sectoral consumption function is QCY c . , in which C  is a )(nxr matrix of 
consumption coefficients, and Q  is a )1(rx  vector of total income for each income group. 
The elements of matrix C  are the quantity of product i consumed by the k
th
 income 
group. Income distribution is introduced by XVQ . , in which V  is the )(rxn matrix of 
shares of family’s income on total production, by sector and income class. This last 
equation connects the productive structure to income distribution.  
 
By manipulating the above expressions, one gets eYVCAIX .).(
1 . Considering 
that 1)(  AIB , one can write eYCVBIBX .)(
1 . The extension of the model to a 
multi-regional setting demands the consideration of interregional flows of inputs and 
outputs. Let RnRmjiZ
,
,  be the monetary flow from sector i  in region mR  to sector j  in 
region nR . The chart below presents the interregional flows. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The detailed model can be found in Moreira (2007) 
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Sectors and Regions 
North (N) 
Northwest 
(NE) 
Mid-West 
(CO) 
Southeast (SE) South (S) 
(i ... j) (i ... j) (i ... j) (i ... j) (i ... j) 
S
ec
to
rs
 a
n
d
 R
eg
io
n
s 
N (i...j) Zij (N x N) Zij (N x NE) Zij (N xCO) Zij (N x SE) Zij (N x S) 
NE (i...j) Zij (NE x N) Zij (NE x NE) Zij (NE xCO) Zij (NE x SE) Zij (NE x S) 
CO 
(i...j) 
Zij (CO x N) Zij (CO x NE) Zij (CO xCO) Zij (CO x SE) Zij (CO x S) 
SE (i...j) Zij (SE x N) Zij (SE x NE) Zij (SE xCO) Zij (SE x SE) Zij (SE x S) 
S (i...j) Zij (S x N) Zij (S x NE) Zij (S xCO) Zij (S x SE) Zij (S x S) 
 
The five macro regions of Brazil were considered, and their economic structures were 
split into 21 sectors. Therefore, the model uses five 21 x 21 input-output tables, including 
interregional trade flows. Data referring to income distribution by sector and region 
comes from 2002 PNAD – Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios, also produced 
by IBGE. Ten income brackets were considered (R$/month): from zero income to 400 
(5.3% of total national household income); 400 – 600 (5.4%); 600 – 1,000 (11.5%); 1,000 
– 1,200 (5.3%); 1,200 – 1,600 (8.9%); 1,600 – 2,000 (8.3%); 2,000 – 3,000 (13.7%); 
3,000 – 4,000 (9.7%); 4,000 – 6,000 (11.9%); and 6,000 and over (19.8%). The 
household expenditure patterns for each income bracket in each region are taken into 
account. Consumption data comes from the 2002-2003 POF – Pesquisa de Orçamentos 
Familiares, implemented by IBGE. 
 
 
4. Simulation Results 
 
The interregional Leontief-Miazawa model briefly described in the previous section was 
estimated for 2002, the last year before the start of President Lula’s first period of 
administration. The simulation strategy is to introduce a shock to that productive and 
distributional situation and to evaluate its impacts. The 2002 base case situation already 
included some influence of social programs, for they started during the previous 
administration.  
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Therefore, the first step was to determine what were the amounts involved in each region. 
Table 4 presents the basic data. The columns referring to 2004, 2005 and 2006 present 
the effective amounts distributed by Bolsa Família. For 2002 and 2003 the data were not 
disaggregated spatially, so that some estimates had to be made. The 2003 PNAD presents 
a special segment on social programs, and the data could be used. A comparison of 
income received by low income persons in 2005 PNAD was made with the official Bolsa 
Família data and the approximation was reasonably good. Therefore, regional shares of 
the 2002 PNAD data on the distribution of “interests, profits, dividends and others” to 
very low-income persons was considered to be the benchmark for the simulations.  
 
As the table indicates, the average annual expenditure on the program more than doubled 
during the Lula administration. For the country as a whole there was a 151% increase, but 
for the poor Northeast region the increase was of 351%. For the richer Southeast region, 
the increase was of only 92%. This gives a first information on the regional impacts of 
such programs. However, in order to assess their final impact, these changes in 
expenditure have to be introduced in the model presented in the previous section. We 
have shocked the earnings of the poorest income bracket in each region by the increase in 
government transfers to that region. We did it in two steps: initially, this extra money was 
introduced in the region as an absolute increase in government expenditure. In the second 
step we considered that this extra money had to come from reduced government current 
expenditures. Since the chain of interrelations in the system is different from the two 
forms of expenditure, it is expected that the final results on income distribution will also 
be different. 
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Lula's
(1) (2) Administration
Mid-West 130.797 219.383 226.801 300.167 376.739 1.123.090
North 119.168 242.595 482.206 618.950 805.087 2.148.839
Northeast 1.169.922 1.676.519 3.111.165 3.623.624 4.281.900 12.693.208
South 231.267 414.757 525.039 692.920 750.044 2.382.759
Southeast 756.846 891.746 1.247.910 1.720.518 1.964.509 5.824.682
Total 2.408.000 3.445.000 5.593.121 6.956.179 8.178.279 24.172.579
Mid-West 5,4% 6,4% 4,1% 4,3% 4,6% 4,6%
North 4,9% 7,0% 8,6% 8,9% 9,8% 8,9%
Northeast 48,6% 48,7% 55,6% 52,1% 52,4% 52,5%
South 9,6% 12,0% 9,4% 10,0% 9,2% 9,9%
Southeast 31,4% 25,9% 22,3% 24,7% 24,0% 24,1%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
(2) PNAD 2003, special segment on social programs
(1) Based on "interests, profits, dividends and others"  received by individuals with total earnings below R$ 120 in 
the Norttheast, R$ 130 in the North, and R$ 140 in the other three regions
(*) Untill 2003 payments to auxílio-gás, bolsa alimentação, bolsa escola and cartão alimentação were summed. 
These separate programs were unified in 2004 under the Bolsa-Família program. Official data from 2004 on.
Table 4 - Government transfers to families by region - Bolsa Família (*)
R$ 1,000 of 2002
Regional shares
 
 
The size of the shock simulated is of R$ 24.172 billion, encompassing the four years of 
the administration. On a yearly basis, it represents 0.45% of national GDP, 0.82% of 
national disposable income, and 13.4% for the poorest income bracket. The results 
presented on Table 5 indicate that this expenditure increases national GDP by 2.96%, 
averaging 0.74% per year. Since more money was given to poor families, the largest 
impacts occurred in the production of manufactured food, agriculture, rent, 
transportation, public utilities, textiles, chemicals and plastics, and communication. In 
regional terms, the Northeast region is the most affected, with a GDP increase of 7.2% 
(1.8% per year, on average), 2.4 times the national increase. The North region is second, 
with 3.35% increase in GDP, and the Mid-West and Southeast regions are the least 
affected, with GDP increases of 2.1%. 
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Considering the distributive aspects, the largest disposable income increase is presented 
by the poorest income bracket, as expected, with a national 2.7% increase, but 8.6% in 
the Northeast. The national average (all income brackets) presents an increase of 2.2%, 
smaller than the increase in GDP. The national Gini moves from 0.5280 in 2002 to 
0.5266 after the shocks, a decrease of 0.25%. This shows that the annual impact of the 
Bolsa Família program is limited, although positive (Table 6). 
 
The above simulation assumes an unrealistic situation in which government increases its 
current expenditure to take care of the social program. The next simulation considers that 
government total expenditure is constant, and that the extra payment to families is 
subtracted from other current expenditures. For that, the previous distribution of 
government current expenditure was used to distribute the amount compensated among 
sectors and regions. 
 
As expected, now the impact on national GDP is different, as Table 5 shows (the 5 largest 
impacts are highlighted). As a matter of fact, it becomes negative, -0.48%, and average of 
-0.12% per year. This happens because the multiplier effects of the sectors negatively 
affected are larger than the positively affected sectors. The same sectors most affected in 
the previous simulation are affected now, with lower impacts. But now some sectors are 
negatively affected, such as public administration, services to business, services to 
families, non mercantile services, communication, other manufacturing, vehicles, 
commerce, financial services, wood and furniture and even construction. The largest 
positive impacts accrue to manufactured food, agriculture, transportation and textiles, but 
rents, chemicals and plastic, mining, machinery and equipment, public utilizes and metals 
also receive some positive effects. 
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Table 5 - Impacts on production, by sector and region
North Northeast Mid-West Southeast South Brazil North Northeast Mid-West Southeast South Brazil
Agriculture 5,31% 17,1% 4,21% 4,40% 4,65% 6,26% 3,21% 14,1% -0,27% 1,34% 2,14% 3,19%
Mining 1,53% 4,7% 1,46% 1,91% 1,10% 2,13% 0,32% 2,2% -1,63% 0,21% 0,11% 0,40%
Metal 1,20% 2,3% 1,45% 1,35% 1,64% 1,45% 0,08% 1,3% -1,68% 0,00% 0,22% 0,12%
Machinery 1,54% 6,0% 2,46% 1,52% 1,20% 1,56% 0,40% 4,1% -8,39% 0,05% 0,26% 0,19%
Vehicles 1,06% 4,6% 1,32% 1,49% 1,53% 1,53% 0,01% 2,3% -4,59% -0,78% -0,40% -0,62%
Wood & Furniture 3,97% 9,0% 2,90% 2,27% 2,48% 2,75% 1,36% 5,4% -8,19% -0,95% 0,22% -0,32%
Chemicals 4,10% 5,8% 3,68% 3,20% 3,06% 3,62% 1,21% 3,5% -5,78% 0,05% 0,45% 0,60%
Textiles 4,89% 7,4% 4,34% 4,19% 2,97% 4,32% 2,37% 4,9% -7,35% 0,45% 0,87% 1,10%
Manfactured Food 8,22% 20,9% 4,25% 4,63% 5,34% 6,62% 5,20% 17,3% -1,11% 1,69% 2,93% 3,41%
Other Manufacturing 1,68% 8,2% 2,36% 2,20% 2,27% 2,43% -0,46% 4,4% -8,52% -1,30% -0,30% -0,80%
Public Utilities 5,47% 9,4% 2,95% 3,06% 3,70% 4,27% 2,77% 6,9% -11,04% -0,52% 1,16% 0,16%
Construction 0,20% 0,4% 0,17% 0,20% 0,24% 0,23% 0,06% 0,2% -1,03% -0,08% 0,04% -0,09%
Commerce 4,31% 7,6% 1,89% 1,95% 2,65% 2,92% 1,29% 4,9% -8,61% -0,92% 0,20% -0,60%
Transportation 7,46% 14,4% 3,00% 2,60% 2,97% 4,66% 4,72% 11,5% -8,79% -0,43% 0,91% 1,23%
Communication 5,17% 6,9% 2,01% 2,17% 2,81% 3,06% 2,26% 4,3% -12,31% -1,11% 0,33% -0,92%
Financial Services 2,69% 3,5% 0,51% 0,72% 0,93% 1,02% 0,92% 2,1% -3,68% -0,42% 0,07% -0,41%
Services to Families 3,34% 6,8% 1,34% 1,69% 2,38% 2,65% 0,97% 4,1% -17,37% -1,90% -0,30% -1,80%
Services to Business 3,14% 6,1% 2,07% 1,00% 2,31% 1,65% -0,40% 2,1% -22,74% -1,25% -0,70% -2,02%
Rent 11,85% 14,0% 5,59% 3,36% 4,23% 4,95% 7,57% 10,6% -20,32% -0,02% 1,88% 0,74%
Public Administration 0,10% 0,2% 0,03% 0,15% 0,16% 0,15% -2,94% -3,4% -21,77% -7,24% -4,24% -8,16%
Non-mercantile Services 5,61% 7,7% 1,02% 1,49% 2,61% 2,55% 1,21% 4,3% -18,29% -1,46% 0,19% -1,75%
All Sectors 3,35% 7,2% 2,15% 2,13% 2,77% 2,96% 1,15% 4,6% -9,51% -0,82% 0,51% -0,48%
Increased government expenditure Constant government expenditure
Impacts on production
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Table 6 - Impacts on household income by region
Income brackets Share(Br zil, 
2002) North Northeast Mid-West Southeast South Brazil North Northeast Mid-West Southeast South Brazil
Up to 400 (1) 5,3% 3,27% 8,6% 1,51% 2,11% 2,63% 4,93% 1,02% 6,0% -12,77% -0,97% 0,37% 1,72%
400 - 600 5,4% 2,87% 7,6% 1,44% 1,93% 2,50% 3,67% 0,69% 4,9% -13,13% -1,13% 0,21% 0,33%
600 to 1 ,000 11,5% 2,77% 6,4% 1,24% 1,82% 2,34% 2,85% 0,45% 3,6% -14,61% -1,48% -0,07% -0,77%
1 ,000 to 1 ,200 5,3% 2,30% 5,4% 1,10% 1,62% 2,18% 2,31% -0,17% 2,5% -15,50% -2,05% -0,28% -1,60%
1 ,200 to 1 ,600 8,9% 2,38% 5,6% 0,85% 1,59% 2,13% 2,27% -0,13% 2,8% -16,52% -2,13% -0,46% -1,86%
1 ,600 to 2 ,000 8,3% 2,55% 5,3% 0,81% 1,50% 2,01% 2,07% -0,01% 2,4% -16,77% -2,31% -0,57% -2,13%
2 ,000 to 3 ,000 13,7% 2,29% 5,4% 0,73% 1,42% 1,97% 2,00% -0,30% 2,5% -17,26% -2,50% -0,73% -2,54%
3 ,000 to 4 ,000 9,7% 2,39% 5,9% 0,61% 1,48% 1,91% 2,08% -0,28% 3,0% -17,32% -2,43% -0,75% -2,62%
4 ,000 to 6 ,000 11,9% 2,21% 5,0% 0,59% 1,47% 2,00% 1,96% -0,36% 2,1% -17,17% -2,25% -0,60% -2,58%6 ,000 tond 
more 19,8% 2,92% 4,6% 0,61% 1,56% 2,28% 2,03% 0,18% 1,7% -17,38% -1,90% -0,35% -2,76%
All brackets 2,64% 6,1% 0,80% 1,59% 2,16% 2,45% 0,15% 3,3% -16,55% -2,01% -0,39% -1,78%
(1) Includes zero income
Increased government expenditure Constant government expenditure
Impacts on household income
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Now the GDP in the Northeast grows only 4.6%, an average of 1.1% per year. At a lower 
level, the North and South regions also get some positive effects. Negative impacts are 
present in the Southeast (-0.82%) and, mainly, in the Mid-West (-9.5%). This is 
explained by the important presence of the federal government in Brasília. As for income 
classes (Table 6), only the two poorest brackets increase their values, with all other 
receiving less money after the shock. An average Brazilian looses 1.78%, an yearly 
average of 0.4%. The very poor income bracket increases its earnings by 1.72% (yearly 
average of 0.42%), and the second poorest by 0.33%. The upper income bracket presents 
an income decrease of 2.76%. This lose-gain situation is present in all regions but the 
Northeast, where even the richest receive income increases (1.72% for the 4-year impact).  
 
These changes lead to a larger change in the national Gini, which decreases 0.39% for the 
4-year impact, moving from 0.5280 in 2002 to 0.5259 after the shock (Table 7). This 
indicates that the loosing sectors present a less pro-poor profile than the sectors that 
benefited from the social programs. Table 5 allows for a comparison of the two shocks 
simulated here. The Mid-West region presents the highest inequality 2002, probably due 
to the presence of the Federal District, which is known for having the highest per capita 
income in the country. The poor Northeast region comes second, with the South being the 
least unequal. The first shock, which assumes increase in total government expenditure in 
the amount of the Bolsa Família payments, indicates that the Northeast region will 
present the most improvement in income inequality, a 0.51% decrease in its Gini 
indicator; the second best would be the Southeast, with -0.08%. Considering that 
government has to compensate the extra expenditure with cuts in other programs changes 
the scenario. As mentioned before, the global improvement in income distribution is 
larger. The Northeast region is still the most benefited, even more than in the previous 
case, but the highlight is the Mid-West region, with the largest change in the Gini 
coefficient, -0.67%. In spite of this, the region maintain its first place in inequality levels. 
 
 
 
 
 21 
Table 7 - Impacts on income inequality
Gini Gini Change Gini Change 
North 0,4659 0,4661 0,04% 0,4655 -0,07%
Northeast 0,4988 0,4962 -0,51% 0,4961 -0,54%
Mid-West 0,5353 0,5351 -0,05% 0,5317 -0,67%
Southeast 0,4666 0,4662 -0,08% 0,4661 -0,10%
South 0,4580 0,4579 -0,02% 0,4576 -0,10%
Brazil 0,5280 0,5266 -0,26% 0,5259 -0,39%
Increased 
government 
expenditure
Constant 
government 
expenditure
Observed     
2002
After Shock
 
 
As for regional concentration, the main object of this paper, the effects are clearly 
favorable as Table 8 indicates. The Northeast region increases its share in national GDP 
from 12.9% to 13.56% and in national income from 16.9% to 17.78%; the North region 
moves from 4,76% to 4,83% in GDP and from 5% to 5.1% in terms of income. The 
Southeast region loses share, from 56.11% to 55.92% in GDP, and from 54.45% to 
54.32% in terms of income. The Mid-West region presents the largest loss, from 7.98 to 
7.26 in GDP, and from 7.24% to 6.16% in income. The South region increases its shares, 
from 18.25% to 18.44% in GDP, and from 16.41% to 16.64% in income.  
 
Thus, clearly the Bolsa Família program presents a clear favorable regional impact. Since 
it is target to poor families, and those are mainly located in poorer regions, it ends-up 
producing a deconcentration effect. This effect is larger if government expenditure is held 
fixed, since the regional pattern of the global effects of government expenditure is pro-
concentration than the global effects of the expenditure of poor families.  
 
5. Final Remarks 
 
This paper has shown that the Bolsa Família program produces positive impacts on 
income concentration, both at the individual level and at the regional level. Assuming that 
it could be continued forever, it could end up producing important improvements in 
income inequality in the country. However, the long term effects of such programs, vis-à-
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vis other types of social intervention (education, health) should be taken into 
consideration. If expanded government investments in social transfers hurt other 
investment-related programs, it will clearly produce a set back in the future.  
 
Table 8. Shares in production value and in income 
 Base line 2002 
Without expenditure 
compensation 
Holding government 
expenditure constant 
 Shares in GDP 
    
North 4,76% 4,77% 4,83% 
Northeast 12,90% 13,43% 13,56% 
Mid-West 7,98% 7,92% 7,26% 
Southeast 56,11% 55,66% 55,92% 
South 18,25% 18,22% 18,44% 
 Shares in disposable income 
    
North 5,00% 5,01% 5,10% 
Northeast 16,90% 17,51% 17,78% 
Mid-West 7,24% 7,13% 6,16% 
Southeast 54,45% 53,99% 54,32% 
South 16,41% 16,36% 16,64% 
 
 
Much more is needed to foster development in the lagging regions: structural policies 
looking at both (i) the supply (human capital) and (ii) the demand side (physical capital). 
Recent government initiatives in Brazil to promote investments in infrastructure include 
the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC, growth acceleration program), 
unveiled at the end of January 2007.
7
 Investments in logistic infrastructure are estimated 
in USD 58.3 billions in the four-year period 2007-2010, USD 33.4 billions (57.3% of the 
total) only in road infrastructure.
8
 
 
One important aspect of macroeconomic management in Brazil, with potential effects on 
the public provision of infrastructure, is the Projeto Piloto de Investimento (PPI, pilot 
                                                 
7
 The PAC will aim to raise average annual GDP growth to 5% per year (almost double the country’s long-
term average), principally through increased investment in infrastructure, which will be fostered in part 
through targeted tax breaks (EIU, February 2007). 
8
 www.brasil.gov.br (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento 2007-2010). 
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project for investment), which permits the government to reduce the primary surplus by 
an equivalent amount to an increase in infrastructure expenditure. PPI will probably be 
increased from 0.2% of GDP to 0.5% of GDP. As the government has formally 
maintained the 4.25% of GDP primary fiscal target
9
 in 2007, this will put the effective 
primary surplus closer to 3.75% of GDP.
10
 In monetary terms, this may represent 
additional USD 1.9 to 4.7 billions to be invested in infrastructure, according to Fipe 
estimates for the PNLT. 
 
Concomitantly to the four-year program (PAC), the central government has also signaled 
its intention in reviving long term planning in transportation in the country. The design of 
an ambitious “Plano Nacional de Logística e Transportes” (PNLT, national plan of 
logistics and transportation) has been initiated, involving different stakeholders. It aims at 
supporting decision makers in attaining economic objectives through policy initiatives 
related to both public and private infrastructure and organization of the transportation 
sector.
11
 
 
Helping the poor is a valid objective. In the short run, the Bolsa Família program has 
proven to produce positive results, both at the personal income level and at the regional 
concentration level, and has surely paid large dividends in electoral terms. Solving 
inequality problems, however, might need other mid and long run policies which could 
improve competitiveness of lagging regions. 
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